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Abstract: Recently, Abdalla et al. proposed a new gateway-oriented password-based authenticated 
key exchange (GPAKE) protocol among a client, a gateway, and an authentication server, where 
each client shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server so that they can resort to the 
server for authentication when want to establish a shared session key with the gateway. In the 
letter, we show that a malicious client of GPAKE is still able to gain information of password by 
performing an undetectable on-line password guessing attack and can not provide the implicit key 
confirmation. At last, we present a countermeasure to against the attack. 
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1. Introduction 
The gateway-based authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols are important 
cryptographic techniques for secure communications. Conceptually, a typical three-party 
password-based authenticated key exchange protocol works as follows. As requirement, each 
client C  shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server so that they can resort to the 
server S  for authentication when want to establish a shared session key with the gateway G . 
Among the various means of authentication that can be considered, the most interesting one from 
a practical point of view is the password-based setting in which a simple human-memorizable 
secret, called a password, is used for authentication. 
In 2005, Abdalla et al. proposed the first gateway-oriented password-based authenticated key 
exchange (GPAKE) scheme among a client, a gateway, and an authentication server [1]. Even 
though Abdalla et al. had proved the session key semantic security of their scheme in a formal 
model, Byun et al. reported an undetectable on-line guessing attack on the GPAKE protocol where 
a gateway can iteratively guess a password and verify its guess without being detected by the 
server [2]. Byun et al. also proposed an improved scheme to eliminate the security vulnerability of 
Abdalla et al.’s scheme. However, Wu et al. [3] found that Byun et al.’s scheme still cannot resist 
the on-line undetectable guessing attack. 
Very recently, Abdalla et al. [5] present a new variant of the GPAKE scheme of Abdalla et al. 
[1]. They used the Schnorr’s signature [6, 7] in the new scheme in order to guarantee the 
security of the new scheme. The new scheme can withstand the attack by Byun et al. [2]. 
In this letter, we review Abdalla et al.’s new protocol [5], and show that it does actually leak 
information of password to a malicious client and can not provide the implicit key confirmation. 
Especially, we show that Abdalla et al.’s new scheme is susceptible to an undetectable on-line 
password guessing attack by a malicious client. We also give a countermeasure against the attack 
by letting the client generate a message authentication code of keying material. 
2. Review of Abdalla et al.’s protocol 
In this section, we will review Abdallar et al.’s protocol. First we introduce some notations 
used in our paper. In order illustrate the protocol clearly, some notations are introduced as follows: 
z C , G  and S denote the client, the gateway and the trusted server separately. 
z Cpw  denotes the password shared between C  and S . 
z CID  and GID denote the identity of C  and G  separately. 
z G denotes a finite cyclic group having a generator g  of bit prime order q . 
z sk  denotes a session key generated between the client and the gateway. 
z 1( )h ⋅ , and 2 ( )h ⋅  denote two secure hash function, such as 1SHA− . 
z H denotes a secure hash function, where *( ) :{0,1}H ⋅ →  G. 
z ( ; , )NIZKPDL m g h denotes the Schnorr’s signature [6, 7] on the message m . 
In Abdallar et al.’s protocol, each client shares a human-memorable password with a trusted 
server. When a client wants to establish a shared session key with a gateway, they resort to the 
trusted server for authenticating each other. Abdallar et al.’s protocol will be described as follows. 
Step 1: C  chooses two random numbers x  and Cr . Then C  computes 
* ( , , )x C G CX g H ID ID pw= × , then sends *1 { , }CM ID X=  to G . 
Step 2: Upon receiving the message 1M , G  sends 
*
2 { , , }C GM ID ID X=  to the server 
S . 
Step 3: Upon receiving the message 2M , the S  generates a random number s , and 
computes *( / ( , , ))sC G CX X H ID ID pw= , sh g=  and *1 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g hπ = . Then 
S  sends 3 1{ , , }M X h π=  to G . 
Step 4: When G  receives 3M , he/she generates a random number y  and computes 
yY h= , *2 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g Yπ = , ( ) yGK X= , *2 ( , , , , )C G GAuthG h ID ID X Y K=  
and the session key *1( , , , , )G C G Gsk h ID ID X Y K= . Then G  sends 
4 1 2{ , , , , , }GM ID h Y AuthG π π=  to C . 
Step 5: After receiving 4M , C  computes ( )
x
CK Y=  and checks weather AuthG  
equals *2 ( , , , , )C G Ch ID ID X Y K . If not, C  stops the session. Otherwise, C  checks weather 
both of 1 2,π π  is valid. If not, C  stops the session, else C  computes the session key 
*
1( , , , , )C C G Csk h ID ID X Y K= . 
3. Security analysis 
3.1. Undetectable on-line guessing attack 
Due to the low entropy, password-based authenticated key exchange protocols suffer from 
so-called exhaustive dictionary attacks. The attacks on PAKE schemes can be classified into three 
types [10]: 
1)Off-line dictionary attacks: an attacker uses a guessed password to verify the correctness 
of the password in an offline manner. The attacker can freely guess a password and then check if it 
is correct without limitation in the number of guesses. 
2)Undetectable on-line dictionary attacks: an attacker tries to verify the password in an 
on-line manner without being detected. That is, a failed guess is never noticed by the server and 
the client, and the attacker can legally and undetectably check many times in order to get sufficient 
information of the password. 
3)Detectable on-line dictionary attacks: an attacker first guesses a password, and tries to 
verify the password using responses from a server in an on-line manner. But a failure can be easily 
detected by counting access failures. 
In the following, we demonstrate an undetectable on-line dictionary attack against the 
Abdalla et al.’s scheme [5] where an adversary is able to legally gain information about the 
password by repeatedly and indiscernibly asking queries to the authentication server. We assume 
that A  has total control over the communication channel between the user C  and the gateway 
G , which means that he/she can insert, delete, or alter any messages in the channel. The detailed 
description of the attack is as follows: 
Step1. A  guesses a password Cpw ′  from a uniformly distributed dictionaryD  and 
computes ( , , )C C G CPW H ID ID pw ′′ = . A  generates a random number x′  and computes 
* x
CX g PW
′ ′= × . Then A  impersonates C  to sends *1 { , }CM ID X=  to G . 
Step2. Upon receiving the message 1M , G  sends 
*
2 { , , }C GM ID ID X=  to the server 
S . 
Step 3: Upon receiving the message 2M , the S  generates a random number s , and 
computes *( / ( , , ))sC G CX X H ID ID pw= , sh g=  and *1 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g hπ = . Then 
S  sends 3 1{ , , }M X h π=  to G . 
Step 4: When G  receives 3M , he/she generates a random number y  and computes 
yY h= , *2 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g Yπ = , ( ) yGK X= , *2 ( , , , , )C G GAuthG h ID ID X Y K=  
and the session key *1( , , , , )C G Gsk h ID ID X Y K= . Then G  sends 
4 1 2{ , , , , , }GM ID h Y AuthG π π=  to C . 
Step 5: A  intercepts the message 4M , C  computes ( )
x
CK Y=  and checks weather 
AuthG  equals *2 ( , , , , )C G Ch ID ID X Y K . If AuthG  equals 
*
2 ( , , , , )C G Ch ID ID X Y K , 
A  find the correct password. Otherwise, A  repeats step 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) until find the 
correct password. 
It is clear that if Cpw ′  equals Cpw , then ( , , )C C G CPW H ID ID pw′ = , 
*
2 ( , , , , )C G CAuthG h ID ID X Y K= , since  
*
( )
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. 
From the description of the attack we know that Abdalla et al.’s scheme [5] does not prevent 
the leakage of information of the password from the malicious client A . In addition, the attack 
can be used to attack Abdalla et al.’s another scheme [1]. 
3.2. Session-Key Problem 
As in the definitions in [9], a key agreement scheme is said to provide the explicit key 
confirmation if one entity is assured that the second entity has actually computed the session key. 
The scheme provides the implicit key confirmation if one entity is assured that the second entity 
can compute the session key. Note that the property of the implicit key confirmation does not 
necessarily mean that one entity is assured of the second entity actually possessing the session key. 
In many applications, it is highly desirable for a key agreement scheme to provide the explicit key 
confirmation. We can see that the scheme of Abdalla et al. [5] merely provides the implicit key 
confirmation, because G  cannot confirm C  has correctly computed the session key after the 
log-in phase. 
4. Countermeasure 
The vulnerability to the undetectable on-line dictionary attack described above actually stems 
from an absence of authentication of message in the scheme. To remedy this vulnerability, we can 
use the method proposed by Byun et al.[2]. First, we let a two party password-based authenticated 
key exchange (2-PAKE) scheme be executed between C  and S  in order to generate a session 
key sk . Then we let C  create a message authentication code (MAC) of *X  using sk . Then, 
S  can check the validity of the *X  through checking MAC of *X  and find the undetectable 
on-line dictionary attack. However, the execution of the 2-PAKE can increase the burden of the 
server, the gateway and the client heavily. So, Byun et al.’s method can not be applied in practice. 
In fact, we just let Abdalla et al.’s scheme provide the implicit key confirmation in order to 
eliminate the security vulnerability. We modify Abdalla et al.’s [5] scheme as follows. 
In our modified scheme, G  requires C  provide the key confirmation by offering 
AuthC . If malicious client A  carry out the undetectable on-line dictionary attack described in 
section 3.1, G  will find the attack, since A  can’t offer the correct AuthC . 
Step 1: C  chooses two random numbers x  and Cr . Then C  computes 
* ( , , )x C G CX g H ID ID pw= × , then sends *1 { , }CM ID X=  to G . 
Step 2: Upon receiving the message 1M , G  sends 
*
2 { , , }C GM ID ID X=  to the server 
S . 
Step 3: Upon receiving the message 2M , the S  generates a random number s , and 
computes *( / ( , , ))sC G CX X H ID ID pw= , sh g=  and *1 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g hπ = . Then 
S  sends 3 1{ , , }M X h π=  to G . 
Step 4: When G  receives 3M , he/she generates a random number y  and computes 
yY h= , *2 ( ; , )NIZKPLD X g Yπ = , ( ) yGK X= , and *2 ( , , , , )C G GAuthG h ID ID X Y K= . 
Then G  sends 4 1 2{ , , , , , }GM ID h Y AuthG π π=  to C . 
Step 5: After receiving 4M , C  computes ( )
x
CK Y=  and checks weather AuthG  
equals *2 ( , , , , )C G Ch ID ID X Y K . If not, C  stops the session. Otherwise, C  checks weather 
both of 1 2,π π  is valid. If not, C  stops the session, else C  computes the session key 
*
1( , , , , )C C G Csk h ID ID X Y K=  and *2 ( , , , , )G C CAuthC h ID ID X Y K= . Then C  sends the 
message 5 { }M AuthC=  to S . 
Step 6: After receiving 5M , S  checks weather AuthC  equals 
*
2 ( , , , , )G C Gh ID ID X Y K . 
If not S  stops the session, else S  computes the session key *1( , , , , )C G Gsk h ID ID X Y K= . 
5. Conclusion 
Very recently, Abdalla et al. [5] present a new variant of the GPAKE scheme of Abdalla et al. 
[1]. However, we find that the new scheme is vulnerable to an undetectable on-line guessing 
attack and can not provide the implicit key confirmation. We also proposed a countermeasure for 
the security vulnerability. 
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